




**Directorate of
Intelligence**

~~**Top Secret**~~



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Afghanistan Situation Report



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31 January 1984

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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

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AFGHAN MIGS ATTACK PAKISTAN VILLAGE

1

Two Afghan MIGs attacked a village in Pakistan in the most serious cross-border incident since the Soviet invasion. [REDACTED]

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PAKISTAN: TENSIONS WITH AFGHAN REFUGEES

1

The Pakistani center-left Movement for the Restoration of Democracy has condemned "privileged treatment" given Afghan refugees. [REDACTED]

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IN BRIEF

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PERSPECTIVE

THE WAR IN THE CITIES [REDACTED]

4

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Despite the importance of Afghanistan's cities, the level of urban insurgency increased markedly in 1983. [REDACTED]

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
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AFGHAN MIGS ATTACK PAKISTAN VILLAGE

Kabul has rejected Islamabad's protest over the air attack on a Pakistani village near the Afghan border on 27 January.

two Afghan MIG fighters bombed and fired rockets at the village--killing 42; injuring more than 60; and damaging 200 shops, a mosque, and a school. The governor of the North-West Frontier Province called the attack deliberate and emphasized that Pakistan was able to defend its borders.

Comment:

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This was the first major cross-border incident since 8 November and the most serious since the Soviet invasion. Soviet and Afghan forces have been conducting operations in neighboring Paktika Province, and the attack may have been accidental since the village is less than one-half mile from the border. We cannot totally discount the possibility that the attack was a deliberate effort to pressure Islamabad to close the border to insurgent infiltrators.

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PAKISTAN: TENSIONS WITH AFGHAN REFUGEES

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The Pakistani center-left Movement for the Restoration of Democracy recently condemned the "privileged treatment" given Afghan refugees, according to press reports. The MRD charged that refugees are appropriating land, taking over transportation, and trafficking in drugs.

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Comment:

While some MRD parties have charged Islamabad with favoring refugees, this is the first time the Movement has taken a public

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position. MRD leaders may think unease about economic competition is growing and hope to exploit the issue against Zia. The governor of the North-West Frontier Province recently told US diplomats he is concerned about "gradually mounting" tensions between refugees and the local populace but called the problem manageable. [REDACTED]

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IN BRIEF

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-- [REDACTED] an insurgent attack heavily damaged the Sorubi hydroelectric facility east of Kabul in late December. In mid-January, an attack on the Pol-e Charki generating plant near Kabul caused some damage but did not close the plant. [REDACTED]

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-- [redacted] the major Afghan
insurgent groups headquartered in Peshawar are not engaged in
drug smuggling. Insurgent leaders believe a small number of
Afghans are responsible for most of the smuggling, abetted by
corrupt Pakistani police. [redacted]

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PERSPECTIVE**THE WAR IN THE CITIES**

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Maintaining control of Afghanistan's cities is essential to the Communists' long-term goal of solidifying their hold on the country. Along with their importance to the economy and the Soviet and regime military effort, the cities provide bases for conscription and tax revenue, for building party membership, and for advancing regime social programs and ideology, thus furthering the process of Sovietization. Despite the importance of the cities, the Communists were unable to prevent the level of urban insurgency from increasing markedly during 1983.

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Thorough Soviet and regime domination of the urban populace, in our view, would limit both the insurgents' urban operations and civilian support for the insurgency. Although the war in the countryside would continue even if the cities were under tight regime control, such control would hamper the insurgents' ability to obtain manpower, supplies, and intelligence and would free additional Soviet and regime military forces for operations against the resistance.

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INSURGENTS' ADVANTAGES

23, 57
The insurgents have gradually increased cooperation in carrying out attacks in cities. Evidence of this improved cooperation appeared in May 1983, when, according to US Embassy reports, three separate insurgent groups jointly attacked the Pul-e Charkhi generating plant in Kabul, destroying or damaging a number of armored vehicles, killing as many as 50 regime troops, and wounding many more. Even more dramatic evidence of cooperation appeared in Kabul three months later with coordinated attacks on the Bala Hissar Fortress, the Microrayon housing complex for Soviet and Afghan officials, and Radio Afghanistan, according to US Embassy reports.

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1, 2, 18, 22, 26
In our judgment, much of the insurgents' success in the cities stems from their use of brief, limited attacks.

typical insurgent operations in cities include assassinations; kidnappings; mining of routes rarely traveled by civilian vehicles;

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[redacted]

bombings; and rocket and mortar attacks on government vehicles, police posts, government buildings, and restaurants frequented by regime personnel. [redacted] when regime security in a city has been heavy, insurgents have concentrated on targets on the cities' outskirts for their own safety or that of the populace. [redacted]

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The insurgents carry out most of their operations at night and avail themselves of the concealment offered by the older, poorer areas of the cities. Night operations, [redacted] provide the insurgents an advantage in that government installations are less well manned then. In our view, the Soviet and regime desire to avoid inflicting damage on government facilities and their own personnel has often made them reluctant to employ airpower and artillery in the cities. The Soviets at times, however, have used heavy weaponry against cities with a strong insurgent presence, as in Qandahar in early 1982.

30, 1, 2

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Mountainous terrain near major cities provides an advantage to the insurgents, permitting insurgent groups to attack and then withdraw to safety. [redacted] In such terrain, Soviet and regime heavy weaponry is less effective, and airborne forces have more difficulty locating and retaliating against insurgents. [redacted]

2

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The urban insurgents have also on occasion displayed technical expertise and ingenuity in adapting to local conditions. [redacted] in Kabul some insurgents with technical skill have wired explosives to the ignition systems of Soviet military vehicles. In Ghazni, [redacted] insurgents have used homemade, battery-powered landmines. In Qandahar, insurgents masquerading as soldiers on conscription patrols caught and killed over a dozen party members and KHAD agents after checking identity cards, according to US Embassy sources. [redacted]

27, 32, 40

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Insurgent success also stems from decentralized leadership, compartmentalization, and careful intelligence and planning. In our view, the decentralization of the insurgent movement prevents the regime from neutralizing it. Even if an important insurgent leader is captured or defects, other bands can continue their independent operations. [redacted] urban insurgents often operate in three-man units. Careful planning has also lent success to some insurgent operations. Attacks inside residences or public buildings are

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normally carried out only if a member has obtained a job inside the building or has some other plausible reason for being there. [redacted]

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We believe civilian support for the insurgency has been essential for the war in the cities. [redacted] "civilian" and "insurgent" are often synonymous, since most civilians at least passively support the resistance, and many fighters also work in the civilian economy much of the year. [redacted]

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1,4,9,37
Civilian hostility to the regime and Soviet forces has shown great resilience. Following heavy bombing of Qandahar in January and March 1982, the populace asked the resistance to limit its activities in the city. [redacted] In March 1983, however, the popular attitude changed following a cordon-and-sweep operation for conscripts and weapons, and resistance activity in the city quickened markedly. In 1983 air bombardment of Herat caused high civilian casualties and great property damage, according to the US Embassy, but the city has remained the scene of intense resistance activity. [redacted]

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3,31,421
49,51
Cooperative urban civilians not only provide insurgents with food and shelter but also enable the resistance to operate its own intelligence networks. [redacted]

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[redacted] In Mazar-e Sharif, [redacted] the insurgent network includes regime civil servants as well as members of Afghan border guard units. [redacted]

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Chronic problems in the Afghan military impede government attempts to maintain urban security. In our view the Afghan Army's unreliability forced the Soviets to use more of their own troops to tighten security in Kabul in the autumn of 1983, and these troops are thus not available for operations in the countryside. [redacted] Afghan forces in several cities openly tolerate an insurgent presence during certain hours of the day. [redacted]

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43,28,
59,60
We believe factionalism in the Afghan Communist party is also heavily responsible for undermining security in several cities, especially Kabul. [redacted] intraparty feuding is responsible for more political assassinations in Kabul than can be

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blamed on insurgents, [redacted] Political assassinations, along with continual factional tension between the Interior Ministry and KHAD, create rivalries that insurgents often exploit to gather intelligence for selecting targets and planning operations. [redacted]

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FACTORS LIMITING THE INSURGENTS

The Communists' extensive daytime security measures in most cities have ensured the functioning of the central--though not always the local--government and discouraged insurgent activity. Local governments in some cities periodically cease to function because of the insurgents' presence, but the central government maintains adequate control of the capital and can operate with only nominal or periodic control of other Afghan cities. In most cities the insurgents lack the organization and firepower necessary to stop government or Soviet security sweeps, clearing operations, and press-ganging conscription operations. [redacted]

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Soviet and regime surveillance networks and informers hamper urban insurgents. In spring 1983, regime authorities in Herat used an insurgent defector to identify guerrillas and resistance supporters among captured civilians, according to US Embassy sources. Urban insurgents and their sympathizers are also subject to identification through a regime surveillance network. [redacted] insurgents from Mazar-e Sharif have only brief, occasional visits with their families for fear that they will be captured by Soviet and regime intelligence services operating within the city. [redacted]

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Although [redacted] the insurgents are gradually improving their weapons skills and are better supplied than in the past, the insurgents' capacity to undermine urban security is often hampered by lack of expertise as well as by periodic shortages of appropriate weaponry and ammunition. Most insurgents have little technical knowledge of explosives, [redacted] and some groups suffer from unequal distribution of weaponry and ammunition. [redacted]

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Although we believe cooperation among insurgent groups has improved over the past two years, political, religious, and ethnic differences periodically result in botched operations or in clashes. In an operation in Mazar-e Sharif, two bands, unaware of each other's plans,

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attacked different sections of the city on the same day. [redacted]
[redacted] The dual attack forced one group to abandon its
primary objective. Differences between the fundamentalists and other
groups have sometimes resulted in pitched battles near cities. [redacted]
[redacted]

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OUTLOOK

In the near term, the insurgents probably will continue to increase the costs for the Soviets as they attempt to improve urban security. Small-scale attacks, bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations will continue and perhaps increase in the months ahead. Civilian support for the urban insurgency is likely to grow. Judging from the way citizens in Qandahar and Herat rebounded following massive bombings of their cities, war weariness is not likely to develop into a significant problem for the urban insurgents in the short term, though it may become an important deterrent over a period of several years. [redacted]

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The urban insurgents, in our view, will not be able to dislodge Soviet and regime forces. Fear of reprisals against civilians, along with Soviet and regime security measures, will prevent the insurgents from greatly expanding urban operations. Soviet and regime forces will continue to control--though tenuously at times--the city centers and to conduct periodic sweeps and house-to-house searches. We believe Moscow would bring in reinforcements from the Soviet Union, if necessary, to maintain control of Kabul and other major cities. [redacted]

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